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Disintegration and Trade 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
The gravity model of trade is utilized to assess the impact of disintegration on 
trade. The analysis is based on three recent disintegration episodes involving 
the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The results point to 
a very strong home bias around the time of disintegration, with intra-union 
trade exceeding normal trade approximately 43 times in the former Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovaki a, and 24 times in the former Yugoslavia. 
Disintegration was followed by a sharp fall in trade intensity. Nevertheless, 
there is a considerable hysteresis in economic relations, with trade flows 
among the former constituent Republics still between two and  30 times 
greater than normal trade in 1998.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY: 
 
Disintegration undoubtedly has an important effect on trade. Yet, the trade literature 
typically ponders the trade effects of integration rather than disintegration, although history 
tells us that countries break up more often than they unite. We use the gravity model to 
assess the impact of disintegration on trade among the former constituent Republics of three 
demised federations in Central and Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. For comparison, we then evaluate the effect of integration on trade—we 
look at German reunification, creation of preferential trade areas (PTA’s) in Western and 
Eastern Europe, and liberalization of trade between Eastern and Western Europe.  
We find that around the time of disintegration, trade flows between the constituent parts 
of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union (represented here by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) and the 
Baltic countries were approximately 43 times greater than normal trade (i.e. the trade 
corresponding to the GDPs of the respective countries and the distance between them). In 
contrast, the trade relations between Slovenia and Croatia were somewhat less intensive, 
exceeding the normal trade intensity approximately 24 times before the break-up. These 
results for the former federations in Eastern Europe thus indicate a very strong home bias in 
comparison with developed market economies. For example, McCallum (1995) finds that 
Canadian provinces trade 22 times more with other provinces than with US states of 
comparable economic size and distance. Helliwell (1997) estimates the home bias of OECD 
countries not sharing the same language to be on average 13.  
Disintegration was followed by a sharp fall in trade intensity in all former federations. 
Nonetheless, the legacy of common past remains strong. In 1998, trade relations still 
exceeded the normal level two times for trade between Slovenia and Croatia, seven times 
for the former Czechoslovakia, 13 times for the Baltics, and 30 times for Belarus, Russia 
and Ukraine. Such trade intensities by far surpass the effects of formal preferential trade 
areas. For comparison, trade within the EU and the CEFTA (Central European Free Trade 
Area) exceeds normal trade approximately one-and-a-half times and two times, 
respectively. Rose (2000) studies the trade impact of currency unions and finds that two 
countries using the same currency trade three times more with each other than two   3
comparable countries using separate currencies. Apparently, common history is more 
important than formal liberalization of trade.  
Compared to trade losses induced by disintegration, the gains following German 
reunification were less dramatic. By 1994, West German exports exceeded normal trade 
five times. Much of this export growth was apparently fueled by government transfers and 
public investments in the former German Democratic Republic. In contrast, West German 
imports from the former East Germany were only 77% above the normal level of trade. As 
such, the trade intensity between the two parts of Germany is closer to the lower bound of 
available estimates of home bias in developed countries.  
In summary, our results suggest that although disintegration is associated with sharp 
deterioration of bilateral trade intensity, the relations between former constituent parts of the 
same federation retain some of their specific nature for several years after splitting up. The 
outside economic and political environment seems to matter as well. The Czech and Slovak 
Republics, which have better access to major Western European markets, experienced a 
deeper collapse of bilateral trade than the Baltics or Belarus-Russia-Ukraine, despite largely 
preserving the common economic area in the former Czechoslovakia. The prospects of an 
early EU membership for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia may have contributed to 
the further fall of trade with their traditional partners in the late 1990s. In contrast, trade 
intensity among Belarus, Russia and Ukraine actually increased in 1998, possibly as a 
consequence of the Russian crises, and efforts towards re-unification between Russia and 
Belarus. Hence, while disintegration matters, the overall context is important as well. 
   4
1  Introduction 
Many papers and monographs have been written recently about economic aspects and 
consequences of integration. This surge of interest reflects the slow but steady intensification 
of integration processes in Western Europe and elsewhere. Yet, history tells us that 
countries break up much more often than they unite. The number of countries on the face of 
the Earth increased more than three-fold during the last century. The economic 
consequences of disintegration are undoubtedly substantial, even when the break-up is 
peaceful. However, very little research has been done to assess the costs of disintegration.  
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap, by looking at three recent disintegration 
episodes in Europe. We use the gravity model to assess the impact of disintegration on trade 
among the former constituent Republics of three demised federations in Central and Eastern 
Europe: the Soviet Union (we look separately on the Baltic countries on the one hand, and 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine on the other hand), Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. For 
comparison, we then evaluate the effect of integration on trade—we look at German 
reunification, creation of preferential trade areas (PTA’s) in Western and Eastern Europe, 
and liberalization of trade between Eastern and Western Europe.  
The gravity model, in an analogy to the Theory of Gravity in Physics, relates the trade 
between a pair of countries to their  economic mass, measured by their respective GDPs, 
and the distance between them. The non-standard nature of trade relations is identified by 
means of dummies for pairs or groups of countries of interest—a positive coefficient implies 
above-normal, or preferential, trade relations whereas a negative coefficient indicates 
below-normal, or discriminatory, trade relations. We estimate the gravity model with trade 
flows among the OECD countries and selected Central and Eastern European countries. By 
estimating the gravity equation separately for each year between 1990 and 1998, we are 
able to observe the evolution of trade patterns over time. We are particularly interested in 
the evolution of bilateral trade within former federations in the wake of disintegration.  
We find that around the time of disintegration, trade flows between the constituent parts 
of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union (represented here by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) and the 
Baltic countries were approximately 43 times greater than normal trade (i.e. the trade   5
corresponding to the GDPs of the respective countries and the distance between them). In 
contrast, the trade relations between Slovenia and Croatia were somewhat less intensive, 
exceeding the normal trade intensity approximately 24 times at the time of the break-up. The 
result for the former Soviet Union, the Baltics and the former Czechoslovakia thus indicates 
a very strong home bias in comparison with developed market economies. For example, 
McCallum (1995) finds that Canadian provinces trade 22 times more with other provinces 
than with US states of comparable economic size and distance. Wolf (1997) estimates a 
similar tendency for ‘excessive’ trade within the federal states in the US. Helliwell (1997) 
estimates the home bias of OECD countries not sharing the same language to be on average 
13. Similarly, Head and Mayer (2000) estimate that an average EU country purchases 14 
times more from domestic producers than from equally distant foreign ones. Nitsch (1998) 
estimates the home bias for EU counties as 7 on average and ranging between 1.8 for the 
Netherlands and 68 for Portugal. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) provide a recent survey of 
estimates of the home bias in several countries.  
Disintegration was followed by a sharp fall in trade intensity in all former federations. 
Nonetheless, the legacy of common p ast remains strong. In 1998, trade relations still 
exceeded the normal level two times for trade between Slovenia and Croatia, seven times 
for the former Czechoslovakia, 13 times for the Baltics, and 30 times for Belarus, Russia 
and Ukraine. Such trade intensities by far surpass the effects of formal preferential trade 
areas. For comparison, our findings indicate that trade within the EU and the CEFTA 
(Central European Free Trade Area) exceeds normal trade approximately one-and-a-half 
times and two times, respectively. Rose (2000) studies the trade impact of currency unions 
and finds that two countries using the same currency trade three times more with each other 
than two comparable countries using separate currencies. Apparently, the common history is 
more important than formal liberalization of trade, although in the case of the Baltics and 
Belarus-Russia-Ukraine, the continuing home bias can be partially attributed also to their 
relative geographical isolation.  
To our knowledge, the effects of disintegration on trade received little attention in 
previous literature. This is probably due to lack of reliable data as well as lack of suitable 
disintegration episodes. The main exceptions are De Ménil and Maurel (1994) who use the   6
gravity model to assess the trade effects of the disintegration of Austro-Hungarian Empire in 
1918 Cheikbossian and Maurel (1998) who analyze the break-down of the CMEA and  
Djankov and Freund (2000) who estimate home bias for trade among selected Russian 
regions before the onset of economic reforms (1987–1990) and for a few years after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992 (1994–1996).  
Instead, most of the literature is concerned with the trade effect of integration, usually 
taking the form of free-trade areas and customs unions (see, for example, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1995, and Soloaga and Winters, 1999) or currency unions (Rose, 2000). Yet, 
it is difficult to distinguish the impact of a preferential-trade area from hysteresis in trade. As 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1996,) point out, formal integration usually follows above-standard 
trade relations in the past. By focusing on disintegration episodes in the time dimension, we 
are able to observe and evaluate the changes in trade patterns in the wake of disintegration. 
We find that although there is considerable hysteresis in trade relations after disintegration, 
the fall in trade intensity is substantial.  
The next section describes the gravity model and discusses the main methodological 
issues. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the results of our empirical 
analysis for former federations in Eastern Europe, German reunification, and formal 
preferential trade areas, respectively. The last section summarizes our conclusions.  
2  The Gravity Model  
The gravity model (Linnemann, 1966, and Linder, 1961) relates the trade flows 
between two countries to the importer’s demand, the exporter’s supply and the costs of 
engaging in trade. The importer’s demand and the exporter’s supply are proxied by 
aggregate outputs of the two countries (in addition, some studies use also the output per 
capita and/or the land area). Trade costs (transport and transaction costs) are proxied by 
geographical distance, typically measured as the distance between the capital cities of the 
two countries. Some studies use also measures of remoteness (see Smarzynska, 1999).  
Although the gravity model of trade is commonly used to assess trade patterns between 
countries or within preferential trade areas, its theoretical underpinnings are ambiguous, and 
were only developed after the model had proven successful in empirical analysis. Helpman   7
and Krugman (1985) formulate the gravity relation in a model with differentiated products 
and increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, Deardorff (1995) derives the gravity 
model in the framework of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and concludes that the gravity model 
characterizes many models and, therefore, it cannot be used for testing trade theories. 
Evenett and Keller (1998) find empirical support for formulations of the gravity model based 
on both the Heckscher-Ohlin model and increasing returns to scale.  
We estimate the gravity model in the following form:  
  e b b b b b + + + + + = ￿
k
k k X M D d Y Y M 4 3 2 1 ,  (1) 
where M stands for bilateral imports,
1  Y is the GDP of the exporting and the importing 
countries (denoted by X and M, respectively), d is the distance between the capital cities of 
both countries,
2 and e is the disturbance term. All these variables are in logs. In line with the 
terminology common for the literature using the gravity model, we refer to the level of trade 
as predicted by the countries’ economic sizes and distance as normal or potential trade. 
The intensity of non-standard trade relations is measured by means of dummy variables, Dk, 
for specific pairs or groups of countries. A positive coefficient estimate implies above-
normal or preferential trade relations whereas a negative coefficient estimate, in contrast, 
implies below-normal or discriminatory trade pattern.  
We include dummies to capture three types of trade relations. First, sharing a common 
border or common language reduces transaction costs. Therefore, we use a dummy for 
countries sharing a common border, and a dummy for English speaking countries. We do 
not include dummies for other languages as most of the other countries (out of those 
included in our data set) sharing a language also share borders.
3 Since the effect of language 
                                                   
1 For various reasons, the data on bilateral trade flows as reported by the two respective countries often differ. 
To ensure consistency, we use trade flows as reported by the importing country.  
2 We are grateful to Holzmann and Zukowska-Gagelmann (1996) for sharing with us their distance matrix. As 
in their paper, we use the center of a triangle defined by Frankfurt, Munich, and Berlin rather than the capital as the 
reference point for Germany.  
3 For example, Austria, Germany and Switzerland, Belgium and France, or Belgium and the Netherlands. The 
main exception is Canada and France having both French as their official language without having a common border.    8
on trade is not our primary interest, we allow for the common-language effect to be picked 
up by the border dummy in these cases.  
Second, we use dummies for formal preferential trade areas in Europe. Specifically, we 
include dummies for the European Union (the 12 countries that formed the EU before the 
last enlargement, denoted henceforth as the EU12), the EFTA, the CEFTA (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), the last EU enlargement round 
(distinguishing trade flows between the EU12 and Austria, Finland, and Sweden, henceforth 
EFTA3), and the Europe Agreements between the EU and the  associated countries.
4 To 
capture the evolution of trade relations, we use the same set of dummies for the entire 
period, i.e. also before the formal agreement was concluded. Finally, we include dummies 
for the successor states of former federations in Central and Eastern Europe. Because of 
problems with availability and reliability of the data, we are unable to include all former 
Republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Therefore, we analyze trade patterns only 
among the Baltic countries, Belarus-Russia-Ukraine, and Slovenia-Croatia. We consider the 
Baltics separately from the rest of the former Soviet Union because of their specific historical 
and political background.  
3  Data 
Our data contain bilateral trade flows for OECD countries (excluding Iceland, Mexico 
and Korea), and selected Central and Eastern European countries. As we are interested in 
the evolution of trade relations during the processes of integration and disintegration that 
occurred during the last decade, we estimate equation (1) for each of the nine available 
years from 1990 to 1998. This data set provides between 600 and 1300 bilateral trade 
flows. The sample size changes because of data availability and especially because new 
countries emerged in Eastern Europe during the analyzed period. The data for Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania span the entire period. The trade data for Belarus, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine start as of 1992, and those for the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia start as of 1993. In addition, we use estimates of pre-
disintegration trade flows between the Czech and Slovak Republics (1991-93) and Slovenia 
                                                   
4 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.    9
and Croatia (1990), as described below. The source of data on trade flows and aggregate 
outputs is the IMF ( Direction of Trade  for  trade flows and International Financial 
Statistics for GDP). Missing data on aggregate output for some CEECs were taken from 
the EBRD Transition Report 1998.  
Bilateral trade flows between constituent parts of former federations such as the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were typically not officially reported, and therefore 
an assessment of the intensity of trade relations prior to the break-up is difficult.
5 An 
exception is the trade between the Czech and Slovak Republics, where alternative data are 
available for 1991-1993, the two years before the break-up and the first post break-up 
year. These data are based on enterprise reports of deliveries between the two Republics.
6 
Two caveats apply to these data. First, they are based on enterprise reports, not customs 
statistics. Second, they include only deliveries of enterprises with 25 and more employees. 
Therefore, these data are not necessarily directly comparable with the official statistics. 
Nevertheless, the estimates obtained for 1993 based on the two types of data are almost 
identical and not statistically significantly different from each other. Therefore, we believe it is 
instructive to use these data to assess the trade intensity before break-up.  
Similar data have been reported for Slovene trade with the other former federal 
Republics of Yugoslavia. According to Mencinger (1998), the rest of Yugoslavia accounted 
for 57.7 % and 58.7 % of Slovenia’s total exports and imports in 1990, respectively. 
Croatia was the most important trade partner (28.8 % of both exports and imports) within 
the former federation. Stiblar (1996) reports a similar trade structure for Slovenia at the end 
of the 1980s. Based on this figures, along with estimates of Slovenia’s total trade (without 
                                                   
5 According to Djankov and Freund (2000), inter-republic trade flows were not reported for the former Soviet 
Union between 1990 and 1993. Boss and Havlik (1994) report several estimates of trade flows among selected FSU 
countries at the beginning of the 1990s. However, these data are hardly comparable to later trade flows due to high 
inflation rate in the successor countries. Furthermore, the range of their estimates makes any comparisons 
questionable, although they generally confirm a significant decline of trade.  
6 The sources of the data are: Vzajomne dodavky medzi SR a CR: 1.-4. stvrtrok 1992, Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic, 1993; and Predaj tovarov medzi SR a CR v roku 1993 podla stvrtrokov, Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic, 1994.   10
the rest of former Yugoslavia) reported by WIIW (1999), we are able to estimate the trade 
flows between Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, one year before independence.  
Finally, we compare the trade development in these countries to trade between West 
Germany and the former German Democratic Republic. Our data are based on German 
Statistical Office’s reports of trade flows (including services) between both German regions 
from 1992 to 1994.
7  
4  Trade Effects of Disintegration  
The number of observations
8 in our dataset nearly doubles between 1990 and 1998 as 
new countries arise from the ruins of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. 
The inclusion of additional observations might affect the results. Therefore, we estimate the 
gravity model as defined by (1) first on a sample of 630 original observations of bilateral 
trade flows, which are available throughout the entire period from 1990 to 1998. We will 
refer to this data subset as the restricted sample, and the results are reported in Table 1. 
Then, we estimate the gravity model on the full sample, containing also observations for the 
newly created countries. The results for the full sample are reported in Table 2. The last set 
of results makes use of alternative estimates of trade between the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Slovenia and Croatia, and the two parts of Germany. For the sake of 
comparability, the results based on these alternative data sources are reported separately in 
Table 3. We estimate a separate equation for each year between 1990 and 1998 in order to 
be able to observe the evolution of trade relations over time. 
Insert Tables 1-3 about here. 
The gravity model gives very good explanation of trade patterns as evidenced by the 
high values of adjusted R
2, all exceeding 0.8. As expected, the effect of distance is negative 
                                                   
7 See  Vierteljahresergebnisse der Inlandsproduktsberechnung, 1991 bis 1994, Früheres Bundesgebiet, 
Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, September 1997, p. 23.  
8 We succeeded to collect nearly all data on trade flows among countries of our sample. For example, we have 
only 23 missing or zero-trade observations for 1997. Therefore, the possible bias of truncated data is not important 
in this  case. See for example Baldwin (1994) and Head and Mayer (2000) for discussion of gravity models 
estimated in truncated data samples.    11
and strongly significant. The coefficients estimated for GDPs of the importing and exporting 
country are not significantly different from each other. This is a general property of the 
gravity model—the home and foreign economies have the same effects on bilateral trade 
flows. Although there is some variation in the coefficient estimates over time, the values for 
individual years are never significantly different from each other at conventional levels. 
Countries sharing the same border, and English-speaking countries trade more intensely with 
each other. After transformation of logs to levels, trade between two neighboring countries 
exceeds the  normal level (trade as predicted by GDP and distance between the two 
countries) of trade nearly 1.5 times, and trade between English-speaking countries exceeds 
the normal level nearly three times. The effects of common border and English language 
appear also very stable over time.  
Our primary interest concerns the trade patterns among the former constituent 
Republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. The intensity of trade 
relations among these countries is reflected in the coefficient estimates for the respective 
dummies (Table 2). In addition, Figure 1 depicts the evolution of these coefficients 
graphically, along with two-standard-error bounds.  
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
The results are strikingly similar for the former Soviet Union, the Baltics and the former 
Czechoslovakia, with trade flows exceeding the normal level approximately 41-43 times
9 
during the first year for which we have data (1991 for Czechoslovakia, and 1992 for the 
Baltics and Belarus-Russia-Ukraine). These results indicate a much higher home bias that 
what is typically found in the literature (cf. McCallum, 1995, Helliwell, 1997, Wei 1996, and 
Nitsch, 1998).  
Clearly, the intensity of trade within the former strongly centralized federations in 
Eastern Europe cannot be justified only by greater efficiency of intra-federation trade. In 
part, it reflected the relative closed nature of these formerly socialist economies and the fact 
that during the early 1990s, their trade with Western Europe was still not very liberalized 
                                                   
9 The coefficient estimates for the first year are between 3.71 and 3.77. The corresponding multiplicative 
factors are exp(3.71)= 40.9 and exp(3.77)= 43.4.    12
(East-West trade relations are discussed in greater detail below). In the case of the Baltics 
and Belarus-Russia-Ukraine, their relative remoteness from the major Western European 
markets probably plays a role too. In contrast to the former Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, the trade between Slovenia and Croatia exceeded the normal level only 24 
(exp(3.184)=24.1.) times in 1990.
10 This extent of home bias, while still high, is more similar 
to that observed for market economies.  
The intensity of trade relations fell sharply after disintegration. To some extent, the 
reduction in trade intensity was natural because of the extremely high inward orientation and 
closed nature of these countries’ economies as discussed above. Most likely, the home bias 
would have fallen even without the break-up. Indeed, in the case of the former 
Czechoslovakia, the trade intensity fell already during 1992, i.e. before the break-up, to 32 
times the normal level. Nevertheless, the timing and the steepness of the decline suggest that 
disintegration was an important factor.  
While the decline in trade intensity occurred immediately after the break-up in the cases 
of Slovenia-Croatia, the Baltics, and the former Czechoslovakia,the decline of trade intensity 
among Belarus, Russia and Ukraine started in the earnest only in 1995. This delay probably 
reflects the continued existence of a common economic area, and in particular the continued 
use of the Soviet (Russian) ruble in the CIS for an intermediate period after the break-up in 
1991.  
The case of the former Czechoslovakia is particularly interesting. The intensity of trade 
between the Czech and Slovak Republics fell sharply and uninterruptedly despite attempts 
by the successor countries to sustain a relatively high degree of integration. The Czech and 
Slovak Republics retained a customs union, a temporary clearing-account payment 
mechanism (until 1997), and free movement of labor (see Dedek, 1996). Yet, the intensity 
of trade relations dropped sharply, especially during 1993 and 1994, i.e. the first two years 
after the division of Czechoslovakia. Bilateral trade, which still exceeded the normal level 32 
times in 1992, fell to 11 times the normal level in 1994. Then, the decline slowed down but 
                                                   
 
10 Note that we do not have trade between Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. This is indicated in Figure 1 on the x-
axis, as well as by a dotted line before 1992.    13
continued, falling eventually to about seven times the normal level in 1998. Although the 
trade intensity as measured by the estimated coefficient on trade flows between the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia declined continuously, the actual volume of trade recovered slightly 
between 1993 and 1998.  
Unlike in the former Czechoslovakia, the trade intensity among the Baltic countries and 
Slovenia-Croatia picked up temporarily after the initial sharp decline of trade in the wake of 
the break-up, before declining further eventually. For the Baltics, the trade intensity fell to 12 
times the normal level in 1994, rising again to 23 in 1997 and finally falling to 13 times the 
normal level in 1998. The trade intensity between Slovenia and Croatia deteriorated to 
three times the  normal level by 1994. After a slight recovery in 1995 and 1996 (with the 
home bias rising to four), it fell again to approximately two times the normal level in 1998.  
The renewed deterioration of bilateral trade among the Baltics and between Slovenia 
and Croatia may be due to the inclusion of Estonia and Slovenia in the first wave of EU 
accession negotiations. This political decision increased the attractiveness of these two 
countries for trade and investment flows from the EU as well as third countries, thus 
diverting trade from the traditional trade partners. The negative opinion of the European 
Commission regarding non-standard trade relations of potential new members with the ‘left-
outs’ may have played a role too. Similar factors may be behind the continued fall of 
bilateral trade between the Czech and Slovak Republics.  
In contrast, the trade relations among Belarus, Russia and Ukraine followed a U-
shaped pattern. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about a sharp deterioration 
of trade, reaching the bottom at eight times the  normal level in 1997. However, 1998 
brought a recovery to more than 30 times the  normal level. Besides potential political 
reasons, such as the Russian-Belarussian attempts at re-integration, this may be a 
consequence of the Russian crisis. The crisis caused a breakdown of trade between the 
FSU and the developed countries. This was reflected in the rise of relative importance of 
trade within the FSU area. In addition, this increase in trade intensity may be driven by 
greater prevalence of re-exports from Belarus and Ukraine to Russia while reporting them 
as bilateral trade.    14
In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that disintegration processes in Eastern 
Europe brought about substantial declines in trade relations between the former constituent 
Republics. Nevertheless, the trade intensity continues to be relatively high, even when 
controlling for common border and membership in free trade areas such as CEFTA. This is 
in line with the findings of Fidrmuc (1999) who notes that Western European countries with 
common history and/or the same or similar languages also have more intensive bilateral trade 
relations. For example, he reports that Austrian trade with Germany is approximately twice 
higher than the normal level, trade between Sweden and Norway, and the UK and Ireland 
exceeds the  normal level 2.5 times, and trade between Belgium and the Netherlands is 
triple the normal level. Accordingly, given the obvious cultural, social and linguistic links 
among the countries included in our analysis, it is reasonable to expect that, absent further 
exogenous shocks, their bilateral trade relations will continue to be substantially more 
intensive than relations with respect to third countries.  
5  German Reunification 
In this section, we consider an episode presenting the counterpart of disintegration—the 
reunification of Germany. Available trade statistics indicate that the reunification brought 
about a sharp increase of trade between former West Germany and the GDR, with the bulk 
of this increase occurring already before the political reunification.
11 According to West 
German data, West German exports to former East Germany nearly tripled between 1988 
and 1990. However, export growth slowed down between 1992 and 1994. The growth of 
West German imports from former East Germany was not nearly as dramatic as the growth 
of exports. In 1994, the volume of West German exports exceeded imports from the East 
approximately five times.  
Because data pertaining the pre-reunification period are not comparable with the later 
data,
12 we estimate the intensity of trade between the two German entities starting with 
1991. Moreover, we were unable to obtain data on East-West trade after 1994. For these 
                                                   
11 After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the two Germanies formed an economic and monetary 
union on July 1, 1990. The political unification formally materialized on October 3, 1990.  
12 The pre-unification data measure only goods exports whereas the later data also include services, see 
Haschke (1993).   15
reasons, our analysis of intra-German post-reunification trade pertains only to the period 
between 1991 and 1994. As the previous discussion suggests, the evolution of West 
German exports and imports differs considerably. Therefore,  we estimate separate 
coefficients for both directions of trade flows.  The distance between West and East 
Germany is estimated as the distance between Berlin and Frankfurt (530 km). Using 
different distance would change the coefficient estimates correspondingly, but not the 
dynamics of estimated trade intensities. GDP estimates for former East Germany are taken 
from Ragnitz et al. (2000). According to Ragnitz et al. (2000) and Von Hagen and Strauch 
(2000), transfers from West German States amounted to between 40 % and 50 % of East 
German GDP during the analyzed period. To account for the transfers, we reduced the 
estimates of East German GDP accordingly. So adjusted GDP better serves as a proxy for 
the supply of goods to explain West German imports from this region.  
According to our estimates (Figure 2), West German exports were approximately six 
times greater than the normal level in 1991. The subsequent years brought a slight decline, 
to five times the normal level in 1994. This trade intensity corresponds to the lower bound 
of available estimates of home bias in developed countries. As such, it is in fact lower than 
the estimate of German home bias (ten) reported by Nitsch (1998). The slight decline in 
intensity of exports may reflect the gradual reduction of budgetary transfers and 
infrastructure investment in former East Germany during the analyzed period. On the other 
hand, the intensity of East German exports to West Germany increased between 1991 and 
1994, albeit remaining at a much lower level: 71% above the normal level in 1991 and 
increasing to 77% by 1994. Hence, our results suggest that the German reunification brought 
about a substantial increase in the intensity of West German exports to former East 
Germany, whereas the intensity of flows in the opposite direction increased much more 
modestly. Apparently, much of the increase in exports was fueled by government transfers 
and infrastructure investments, rather than East German demand. As transfers and 
investments continue to fall in the future, so will the intensity of West German exports.  
Insert Figure 2 about here.   16
6  Formal Preferential Trade Areas 
The results presented in the previous section suggest that the former constituent 
Republics of demised federations continue t o have strong trade relations, although their 
intensity is much less than before the break-up. In the present section, we discuss the trade 
effects of formal preferential -trade areas—the EU, EFTA, CEFTA and the Europe 
Agreements—and compare them with trade patterns within the former federations.  
Trade among the five Central European countries that eventually formed the CEFTA 
(Central European Free Trade Agreement) was initially on a downward trajectory following 
the dissolution of the CMEA in 1991—see Figure 3.
13 During 1992 and 1993, trade within 
CEFTA (encompassing initially the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and 
subsequently extended to include also Slovenia 14) roughly corresponded to their incomes 
and distances (after controlling for the special trade relations between the Czech and Slovak 
Republic). Afterwards, trade relations gradually intensified, until reaching approximately 
twice the normal level of trade by 1997. According to the full sample, intra-CEFTA trade 
deteriorated again in 1998, to some 40 % above the normal level, it remains to be seen 
whether this is change in trend will be sustained.  
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
Trade between Western and Eastern European countries was affected by many trade 
restrictions during the cold war period, and, unsurprisingly, was far below the normal level 
at the beginning of the 1990s. According to the restricted sample, the trade of the 12 
member states of the European Community with the group of countries, with which it later 
concluded the Europe Agreements
15, was about 40 % below the normal level. The trade of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden with these countries was one-third below the normal level. 
According to the full sample, the trade intensity was even lower. Trade liberalization 
following the collapse of communist regimes boosted trade among the former cold-war 
                                                   
13 Cheikbossian and Maurel (1998) show that the collapse of trade among the CMEA countries started already 
in the mid 1980s.  
14 Bulgaria and Romania recently joined the CEFTA too, however, in our analysis we only consider the trade 
flows among the four founding members and Slovenia 
15 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.    17
adversaries. The results based on the restricted sample indicate that trade between the 
EC12 and the associated countries reached the  normal level by 1993. The EFTA3 
countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) liberalized their trade with the associated countries 
even faster. However, according to the full sample, which also includes the newly created 
countries, the trade relations of both the EC12 and EFTA3 with the associated countries did 
not reach the normal level until 1995.  
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
Formation of free trade areas in Western Europe had a positive although not very 
strong effect on trade flows—see Figure 5. In fact, the trade effect of Western European 
preferential-trade areas falls short even of that of the CEFTA. Trade between two EC12 
countries exceeds trade between two comparable non-EU countries by one half on average. 
Despite deepening integration during the 1990s, in particular introduction of the Single 
Market in 1992, the effect of the EU on trade intensity remained stagnant. In fact, it appears 
that intra-union trade intensity actually declined slightly over time. The coefficient estimate fell 
from 0.417 in 1990 to 0.355 in 1998, although this decline is not statistically significant.
16 
The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 had little if any effect on the trade 
intensity between the original EU members and the new members. The effect of the EFTA 
on trade intensity is even smaller. Although the coefficient estimate is positive, it is not 
significant at all except for 1992-93. At its peak in 1993, trade intensity within EFTA 
exceeded the normal level by less than 30 %. In contrast, the trade relations of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden (EFTA3) with the EU were much more intense than the trade relations 
within EFTA. By 1990, the EFTA3 countries traded by about one-fourth more with the EC 
countries than with the other countries in our sample. The main upward shift in the trade 
intensity occurred already in 1992 and preceded both the formation of the European 
Economic Area and the entry of these three countries to the European Union.  
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
                                                   
16 This disappointing result is in line with the findings of Soloaga and Winter (1999), and others.    18
7  Sensitivity Analysis—Augmented Gravity Models  
In this Section, we subject our results to robustness checks by replicating the analysis 
for alternative specifications of the gravity model augmented by additional explanatory 
variables. Besides assessing robustness, some of these variables, especially those related to 
exchange-rate variability, can provide additional insights on factors explaining the sharp 
decline of the ‘home bias’ in the wake of disintegration. 
The first extension of the gravity equation is a measure of remoteness. Deardoff (1995) 
argues that not only the distance between two countries determines the bilateral trade 
volume, but also their geographic position relative to other countries. Given bilateral 
distance, two countries trade more if they are both more distant to other potential trade 
partners. Following this argument, Wei (1996) augments the gravity model by the following 
measures of the exporter’s and importer’s overall remoteness, RX and RM, respectively,  
  ￿ =
i
ik i k D w R , k = X, M,   (2) 
which is defined as a weighted average of distances to other countries, with the weight wi is 
the share of country  i in world output.
17 As the countries under focus in this paper are 
located on the periphery (at least relative to the countries included in our sample), the former 
members of disintegrated countries should on average trade more intensively than similar, 
but more centrally located, countries.  
Another extension of the gravity model is to reveal exchange rate effects (including 
formation of a currency union) on trade flows. Rose (2000) estimates that countries with a 
common currency t rade over three times as much with other as countries with different 
currencies. This result is reexamined and confirmed by Rose and Frankel (2000).  
Unfortunately, we cannot separately estimate the effects of currency separation and 
political disintegration because the two events typically unfolded nearly parallel to each 
other. Nevertheless, the increased exchange rate volatility between the affected countries 
                                                   
17 We also tried an alternative measure of remoteness used by Wolf (1997) defined as ratio of the bilateral 
distance to an average of RX and RM, RIJ = DIJ / 0.5 (RX + RM). However, this remoteness measure was less robust than 
those defined by (2).    19
should bring about a decline in bilateral trade. Following Frankel (2000), we therefore 
augment  the gravity equation with a measure volatility (standard deviation) of monthly 
bilateral exchange rate (first differences of logs), sij, in respective years. Furthermore, we 
include also the importer’s and exporter’s average exchange rate volatility towards their 
trade partners as Wei (1996),  n s s
n
j ij i ￿ = .  
However, we should keep in mind that the effects of exchange rate volatility are 
generally less robust that those of currency unions. According to Frankel (2000), a 
reduction of exchange rate volatility is of magnitude less important than the effects of a 
currency union, but these effects are statistically significant. Wei (1996) even fails to find 
significant and theory consistent effects of exchange rate volatility on trade flows at all.  
Thus, our augmented version of the gravity model, see (1), includes five additional 
variables: remoteness of exporter and importers, RX and RM, respectively, bilateral exchange 
rate volatility, sij, and the average exchange rate volatilities of both trade partners, sX and sM, 
respectively,  
  e b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿
= = k
k k
M X i
i i
M X j
j j ij X M D R s s d Y Y M
, ,
5 4 3 2 1 ) log( . (3) 
The results of the augmented gravity model are reported in Table 4. The inclusion of 
additional variables does not change our results dramatically. Remoteness of exporter and 
importer has the correct (positive) sign. In general, our results do not show any stable effect 
of bilateral exchange rate variability on trade flows, although we do find negative and 
significant effects of average exchange-rate volatility of both exporter and importer for 
several years.  
Insert Table 4 about here. 
In fact, the effect of bilateral exchange-rate volatility turns out significant and positive in 
four years (1992, 1995, 1996 and 1998) whereas it is estimated as significantly negative 
only in one year (1991). This can be due to the inclusion of additional Central and Eastern 
European countries, with high trade growth and high exchange-rate fluctuations. Indeed, the 
bilateral exchange rate has the correct (negative) sign when we estimate (3) with the   20
restricted sample at the beginning of the analyzed period, although the estimated coefficient 
is again not robust in the subsequent years.
18  
Importantly, the inclusion of additional variables has little effect on our estimates of 
home bias for the former federations in  Eastern Europe (and especially so for Slovenia-
Croatia and the former Czechoslovakia). For most of the analyzed period, the estimates of 
home bias differs little whether estimated with the traditional or augmented gravity model. 
Hence, the relative remoteness of these countries and the exchange-rate volatility after the 
break-up do note explain the size of this bias. Given the overall low robustness of these 
additional variables, the traditional specification of the gravity model seems to be more 
appropriate for this kind of analysis.  
Further possible sophistications of the gravity model concern the estimation technique. 
So far, we estimated gravity models in a series of independent cross sections for individual 
years. Baldwin (1994), Mátyás (1997) and Cheng and Wall (1999) argue that instead 
panel-data techniques are more appropriate. In particular, Cheng and Wall (1999) argue 
that, in cross-section analysis, the gravity model yields biased estimates, which tend to 
overestimate trade between low-trade countries and to underestimate it between high trade 
countries.  
Therefore, we estimate the gravity model in three alternative specifications (see Table 
5): (a) pooled cross section, (b) fixed effects model with time effects for individual years (tt), 
and (c) fixed effect model with country effects (fij).  
  e b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿
= = k
k k
M X i
i i
M X j
j j ij X M D R s s d Y Y M
, ,
5 4 3 2 1 ) log( (4a) 
e b b b b b b b t + + + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
= = = k
k k
M X i
i i
M X j
j j ij X M
t
t D R s s d Y Y M
, ,
5 4 3 2
1998
1990
) log(  (4b) 
  e b b b b b f + + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿￿
= k
k k
M X j
j j ij X M
i j
ij D s s Y Y M
,
5 3 2   (4c) 
Following Cheng and Wall (1999), we formulate fixed effects for each of 
approximately 1300 pairs of trade partners and for both directions of trade flows, i.e. 
                                                   
18 These results are available from the authors on request.    21
fij „ fij. The set of fixed country and time effects replaces the constant in the equation. We 
measure the effects of disintegration by including a set of dummy variables for selected 
groups of countries in each available year. This set is multicollinear with the fixed country 
effects, therefore, we drop one fixed effect for each group of countries created from former 
multinational federations. The fixed country effects reflect all factors, which are constant for 
a given pair of countries. Therefore, we have to drop distance, participation in various free 
trade agreements, and measures of remoteness in the third specification. Time effects (not 
reported in the Table) in general do not seem important for explanation of trade between 
1990 and 1998.  
Insert Table 5 about here. 
Indeed, the gravity models estimated for panel data perform slightly better than cross-
section estimates. In particular, the average volatility of exchange rates of importing and 
exporting country has the correct sign (negative) and is highly significant in the regression 
with country effects. In contrast, volatility of the bilateral exchange rate still has the wrong 
sign (and is significant). Most importantly, the fixed effect estimation of gravity models 
confirm our conclusions regarding home bias in the former federations. The main difference 
is that the home bias estimated with fixed country effects for the former Czechoslovakia and 
Slovenia-Croatia appears higher than the estimates obtained in cross section. Nevertheless, 
the evolution of the home bias is essentially the same. In all countries, trade intensity declined 
dramatically after disintegration.  
8  Conclusions 
Our objective in this paper was to investigate the impact of disintegration on trade. 
Unlike the impact of integration, the economic consequences of disintegration have been 
little explored in the literature. We study three recent disintegration episodes in Europe—the 
break-ups of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia between 1991 and 1993. 
Using the gravity model of trade, we assess the evolution of trade relations among the 
former constituent Republics of these federations in the wake of disintegration. We find 
evidence of a strong home bias in the former federations: around the time of disintegration, 
trade between the constituent parts of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union (represented here by   22
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine) and the Baltic countries was approximately 43 times greater 
than trade with third countries (controlling for GDP and distance). The home bias was lower 
in Slovenia and Croatia, with their bilateral trade exceeding normal trade only 24 times in 
1990. Disintegration was followed by a sharp deterioration of this home bias. Nevertheless, 
tradi tional relations die hard, and, by 1998, trade within the former federations exceeded 
normal trade twice for Slovenia-Croatia, seven times for the former Czechoslovakia, 13 
times for the Baltics, and 30 times for Belarus-Russia-Ukraine.  
As the evidence from German reunification suggests, integration (or reintegration in this 
specific case) is followed by an increase in bilateral trade. However, the home bias 
estimated for trade between West Germany and the former GDR is dwarfed by the results 
for the former federations in Eastern Europe and even falls short of the home bias estimated 
for West Germany by Nitsch (1998). Indeed, the data indicate that the intensity of West 
German exports to the former GDR declined gradually between 1991 and 1994. On the 
other hand, the increase of East German exports has been much more modest.  
In comparison to the formal preferential-trade areas in Eastern and Western Europe, 
trade relations among the former constituent Republics of demised federations appear very 
strong. The difference is particularly pronounced with respect to the intra-EU trade—we 
found that EU membership on average increases bilateral trade only 1.5 times. Trade 
intensity in the former federations continues to be high despite greater open and hidden 
barriers to trade among the successor countries, transaction costs, exchange rate uncertainty 
and political instability. Hence, the legacy of common past and traditional relations have very 
strong effects on international trade, apparently much stronger that the effect of formal trade 
liberalization.  
These results suggest that although disintegration is associated with sharp deterioration 
of bilateral trade intensity, the relations between former constituent parts of a federation 
retain some of their specific nature for several years after splitting up. The outside economic 
and political environment seems to matter as well. The Czech and Slovak Republics, which 
have better access to major Western European markets, experienced a deeper collapse of 
bilateral trade t han the Baltics or Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, despite generally lower 
barriers to trade in the former Czechoslovakia. The prospects of an early EU membership   23
for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia may have contributed to the further 
deterioration o f trade with their traditional partners in the late 1990s. In contrast, trade 
intensity among Belarus, Russia and Ukraine actually increased in 1998, possibly as a 
consequence of the Russian crises, and efforts towards re-unification between Russia and 
Belarus. Hence, while disintegration matters, the overall context is important as well.  
Our findings are broadly consistent with earlier findings on currency unions. In 
particular, Rose (2000) shows that a common currency increases bilateral trade flows 
approximately three times. Indeed, we found a decline of bilateral trade intensity by about 
this factor in the first years of the existence of the new independent states. However, we 
cannot separate the effect of currency separation from the effect of political disintegration as 
both effects occurred simultaneously in the countries under scrutiny. However, we do not 
find a significant effect of the volatility of exchange rates on bilateral trade within our data 
set.  
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Figure 1: Disintegration in Eastern Europe, Full Sample  
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Note: We use estimates for trade flows between the Czech Republic and Slovakia according to delivery statistics of 
large enterprises in Slovakia (1991-1993), which are not fully comparable to later custom statistics (1993-1997) 
causing a discontinuity in our estimates in 1993. Trade flows between Slovenia and Croatia in 1990 are according to 
Mencinger (1998) and WIIW (1999), while trade data on 1991 are not available.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: German Reunification, Restricted Sample 
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Figure 3: Trade Liberalization in Eastern Europe 
  A: Restricted Sample
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Note: 
* The restricted sample only contains bilateral trade flows that are available during the whole period 1990-
1998. 
 
 
Figure 4: Trade Relations between East and West 
A: Restricted Sample 
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B: Full Sample  
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Note: 
* The restricted sample only contains bilateral trade flows that are available during the whole period 1990-
1998.   28
Figure 5: Free Trade Areas in Western Europe, Restricted Sample
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Note: 
* The restricted sample only contains bilateral trade flows that are available during the whole period 1990-
1998. 
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Table 1 Gravity Model of Trade Flows, Restricted Sample 
  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 
No. of observations  630 630  630 630  630 630 630  630 630 
Adjusted R
2   0.8698 0.8853  0.8358 0.8029  0.8361 0.8479 0.8478  0.8407 0.8161 
Constant  3.346 3.659  3.796 3.765  3.519 3.285 3.480  3.604 3.552 
  (8.742) (9.540)  (10.251) (10.358)  (9.962) (9.128) (10.121)  (10.519) (10.242) 
GDP of importing country  0.875 0.839  0.838 0.838  0.850 0.868 0.861  0.857 0.845 
  (36.485) (35.237)  (36.879) (36.946)  (36.663) (37.394) (39.104)  (37.823) (35.882) 
GDP of exporting country  0.913 0.894  0.909 0.925  0.911 0.922 0.921  0.909 0.902 
  (40.054) (44.008)  (43.995) (45.415)  (45.092) (42.083) (44.140)  (44.257) (40.754) 
Distance  -0.866 -0.872  -0.884 -0.900  -0.881 -0.876 -0.888  -0.875 -0.868 
  (-21.313) (-21.950)  (-22.333) (-22.616)  (-22.308) (-21.557) (-22.887)  (-22.214) (-21.796) 
Dummy: Common border   0.406 0.445  0.427 0.398  0.421 0.385 0.389  0.397 0.386 
  (3.617) (3.606)  (3.257) (3.084)  (3.241) (3.185) (3.359)  (3.589) (3.332) 
Dummy: English speaking countries  1.136 1.109  1.105 1.174  1.180 1.251 1.154  1.130 1.276 
  (6.178) (5.953)  (5.469) (6.122)  (6.262) (6.946) (6.397)  (6.065) (7.001) 
Dummy: EC12   0.417 0.370  0.391 0.389  0.357 0.388 0.361  0.375 0.355 
  (5.459) (4.892)  (5.134) (5.134)  (4.779) (4.961) (4.669)  (4.836) (4.517) 
Dummy: CEFTA  0.418 0.451  0.164 0.217  0.378 0.557 0.554  0.641 0.626 
  (1.249) (2.960)  (1.353) (1.825)  (3.257) (3.213) (3.159)  (3.094) (2.997) 
Dummy: Europe Agreements  -0.528 -0.201  -0.240 -0.052  0.025 0.124 0.140  0.132 0.259 
  (-4.832) (-1.626)  (-2.027) (-0.484)  (0.237) (1.220) (1.466)  (1.310) (2.632) 
Dummy: EFTA  0.189 0.094  0.228 0.253  0.198 0.195 0.116  0.083 0.165 
  (1.845) (0.900)  (2.041) (2.138)  (1.592) (1.463) (0.823)  (0.578) (1.147) 
Dummy: EC12- EFTA3  0.240 0.196  0.281 0.342  0.319 0.299 0.279  0.275 0.297 
  (2.836) (2.374)  (3.550) (4.267)  (3.924) (3.379) (3.180)  (3.224) (3.201) 
Dummy: EFTA3-Associated   -0.400 0.034  0.091 0.137  0.271 0.112 0.090  0.092 0.219 
 countries  (-1.975) (0.225)  (0.628) (0.959)  (1.671) (0.759) (0.659)  (0.652) (1.749) 
Notes: T-statistics (heteroscedasticity robust) in parentheses. Estimated on bilateral trade flows among OECD countries (excl. Mexico and Korea), and Central and Eastern European countries. 
CEFTA includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. EC12 refers to the 12 countries who were the members of the European Community until 1995. EFTA includes 
EFTA3 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden ) and Norway and Switzerland. Associated countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.    30
Table 2 Gravity Model of Trade Flows, Full Sample 
  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994  1995 1996  1997 1998 
No. of observations  670 643  836 1140  1219  1248 1247  1238 1247 
Adjusted R
2   0.8698 0.8853  0.8358 0.8029  0.8361  0.8479 0.8478  0.8407 0.8161 
Constant  3.372 3.663  4.426 4.691  4.786  4.206 4.136  4.311 4.776 
  (8.400) (9.613)  (10.137) (13.123)  (15.977)  (14.610) (14.887)  (15.281) (15.036) 
GDP of importing country  0.873 0.852  0.903 0.838  0.845  0.873 0.853  0.855 0.823 
  (35.596) (36.001)  (38.751) (43.194)  (47.957)  (51.761) (50.953)  (51.032) (40.779) 
GDP of exporting country  0.924 0.899  0.865 0.872  0.860  0.939 0.959  0.958 0.935 
  (40.777) (44.504)  (36.782) (44.072)  (48.944)  (55.925) (57.897)  (54.998) (45.399) 
Distance  -0.877 -0.886  -0.976 -0.988  -1.007  -1.024 -1.016  -1.025 -1.040 
  (-21.689) (-21.920)  (-20.744) (-24.005)  (-26.899)  (-28.098) (-28.010)  (-27.599) (-23.753) 
Dummy: Common border   0.317 0.454  0.608 0.537  0.760  0.664 0.631  0.595 0.670 
  (2.552) (3.706)  (3.575) (2.251)  (5.691)  (5.567) (5.712)  (5.364) (5.009) 
Dummy: English speaking   1.169 1.128  1.179 1.342  1.360  1.536 1.479  1.493 1.535 
 countries  (6.381) (6.048)  (5.828) (7.333)  (7.557)  (8.713) (8.273)  (7.980) (8.498) 
Dummy: EC12   0.437 0.364  0.288 0.377  0.289  0.396 0.447  0.471 0.309 
  (5.650) (4.821)  (3.498) (4.570)  (3.852)  (5.070) (5.815)  (6.143) (3.730) 
Dummy: CEFTA  0.842 0.466  0.050 0.195  0.163  0.537 0.613  0.681 0.344 
  (2.783) (3.051)  (0.334) (0.901)  (0.965)  (3.627) (4.227)  (4.653) (2.387) 
Dummy: Europe Agreements  -0.580 -0.190  -0.303 -0.351  -0.337  0.015 0.141  0.193 0.014 
  (-5.114) (-1.564)  (-2.329) (-3.573)  (-3.875)  (0.191) (1.889)  (2.524) (0.177) 
Dummy: EFTA  0.230 0.089  0.070 0.158  -0.022  0.099 0.120  0.110 -0.011 
  (2.100) (0.876)  (0.637) (1.104)  (-0.209)  (0.881) (0.985)  (0.880) (-0.087) 
Dummy: EC12- EFTA3  0.245 0.190  0.233 0.344  0.294  0.375 0.409  0.411 0.306 
  (2.896) (2.310)  (2.771) (4.448)  (3.684)  (4.230) (4.714)  (4.803) (3.174) 
Dummy: EFTA3-Associated   -0.364 0.057  0.350 -0.207  -0.119  0.127 0.181  0.237 0.055 
 countries  (-1.982) (0.392)  (1.879) (-1.344)  (-0.828)  (0.966) (1.393)  (1.766) (0.415) 
Dummy: Baltic States    3.766 3.188  2.485  3.024 3.088  3.142 2.556 
    (13.130) (9.454)  (8.241)  (14.533) (16.165)  (11.585) (11.202) 
Dummy: Russia-Belarus-    3.771 3.467  3.480  2.407 2.207  2.057 3.427 
 Ukraine    (15.740) (9.596)  (16.561)  (18.024) (18.347)  (9.807) (8.663) 
Dummy: Slovenia-Croatia    2.382 2.021  1.075  1.413 1.404  1.231 0.708 
    (10.535) (6.124)  (7.004)  (7.823) (8.872)  (5.695) (2.810) 
Dummy: Former Czechoslovakia     2.905  2.359  2.245 2.099  2.006 1.939 
    (12.968)  (14.550)  (15.885) (15.472)  (12.224) (12.350) 
Notes: See Table 1.    31
Table 3 Gravity Model of Trade Flows, Using Alternative Estimates of Trade Flows between Selected Pairs of Countries 
  1990
SLO  1991
CS  1992
CS  1993
CS
1991
GE  1992
GE  1993
GE  1994
GE 
No. of observations  672  645  838  1140 632  632  632  632 
Adjusted R
2   0.8699  0.8855  0.8360  0.8028 0.8825  0.8805  0.8803  0.8786 
Constant  3.372  3.663  4.426  4.691 3.659  3.796  3.765  3.519 
  (8.400)  (9.613)  (10.137)  (13.123) (9.540)  (10.251)  (10.358)  (9.962) 
GDP of importing country  0.873  0.852  0.903  0.838 0.839  0.838  0.838  0.850 
  (35.596)  (36.005)  (38.752)  (43.195) (35.237)  (36.879)  (36.947)  (36.663) 
GDP of exporting country  0.924  0.899  0.865  0.872 0.894  0.909  0.925  0.911 
  (40.780)  (44.510)  (36.787)  (44.071) (44.008)  (43.995)  (45.415)  (45.092) 
Distance  -0.877  -0.886  -0.976  -0.988 -0.872  -0.884  -0.900  -0.881 
  (-21.689)  (-21.920)  (-20.744)  (-24.005) (-21.950)  (-22.333)  (-22.616)  (-22.308) 
Dummy: Common border   0.317  0.454  0.608  0.537 0.445  0.427  0.398  0.421 
  (2.552)  (3.706)  (3.575)  (2.251) (3.606)  (3.257)  (3.084)  (3.241) 
Dummy: English speaking   1.169  1.128  1.179  1.342 1.109  1.105  1.174  1.180 
 Countries  (6.381)  (6.048)  (5.828)  (7.333) (5.953)  (5.469)  (6.122)  (6.262) 
Dummy: EC12   0.437  0.364  0.288  0.377 0.370  0.391  0.389  0.357 
  (5.650)  (4.821)  (3.498)  (4.570) (4.892)  (5.134)  (5.134)  (4.779) 
Dummy: CEFTA  0.842  0.466  0.050  0.195 0.451  0.164  0.217  0.378 
  (2.783)  (3.051)  (0.334)  (0.901) (2.960)  (1.353)  (1.825)  (3.257) 
Dummy: Europe Agreements  -0.580  -0.190  -0.303  -0.351 -0.201  -0.240  -0.052  0.025 
  (-5.114)  (-1.564)  (-2.329)  (-3.573) (-1.626)  (-2.027)  (-0.484)  (0.237) 
Dummy: EFTA  0.230  0.089  0.070  0.158 0.094  0.228  0.253  0.198 
  (2.100)  (0.876)  (0.637)  (1.104) (0.900)  (2.041)  (2.138)  (1.592) 
Dummy: EC12- EFTA3  0.245  0.190  0.233  0.344 0.196  0.281  0.342  0.319 
  (2.896)  (2.310)  (2.771)  (4.448) (2.374)  (3.550)  (4.267)  (3.924) 
Dummy: EFTA3-Associated   -0.364  0.057  0.350  -0.207 0.034  0.091  0.137  0.271 
 Countries  (-1.982)  (0.392)  (1.879)  (-1.344) (0.225)  (0.628)  (0.959)  (1.671) 
Dummy: Baltic States      3.767  3.188        
      (13.130)  (9.454)        
Dummy: Russia-Belarus-      3.771  3.467        
 Ukraine      (15.741)  (9.596)        
Dummy: Slovenia-Croatia  3.184    2.382  2.021        
  (15.746)    (10.535)  (6.124)        
Dummy: Former Czechoslovakia     3.713  3.466  2.798        
    (22.106)  (16.628)  (12.568)        
Dummy: West German Exports to         1.801  1.731  1.685  1.603 
 former East Germany        (16.039)  (14.610)  (14.344)  (13.608) 
Dummy: West German Imports from         0.536  0.555  0.621  0.574 
 former East Germany        (4.645)  (4.710)  (5.355)  (4.934) 
Notes: See Table 1. 
SLO Estimates of trade flows between Slovenia and Croatia according to Mencinger (1998) and WIIW (1999). 
CS Enterprise delivery statistics as estimates of trade flows 
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia for 1991-1993. 
GE Trade flows (including services) between West Germany and former East Germany according to German Statistical Office.    32
Table 4 Augmented Gravity Model of Trade Flows, Full Sample 
  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994  1995 1996  1997 1998 
No. of observations  619 643  641 1140  1219  1248 1247  1238 1247 
Adjusted R
2   0.8735 0.8902  0.8851 0.8076  0.8414  0.8505 0.8514  0.8420 0.8296 
Constant  -9.316 -9.096  -9.179 -6.527  -3.452  -2.618 -2.135  -2.447 -1.945 
  (-3.335) (-3.080)  (-3.059) (-2.243)  (-1.171)  (-0.891) (-0.770)  (-0.896) (-0.686) 
GDP of importing country  0.926 0.898  0.897 0.896  0.887  0.889 0.879  0.874 0.869 
  (35.056) (35.308)  (37.964) (41.257)  (47.113)  (49.260) (48.327)  (46.396) (44.382) 
GDP of exporting country  0.937 0.958  0.960 0.928  0.904  0.955 0.993  0.989 0.993 
  (37.734) (40.921)  (45.392) (44.013)  (47.694)  (52.977) (54.431)  (49.454) (45.503) 
Distance  -0.989 -1.043  -1.094 -1.080  -1.100  -1.118 -1.118  -1.109 -1.128 
  (-17.841) (-16.903)  (-18.769) (-22.595)  (-24.946)  (-25.564) (-26.365)  (-26.374) (-24.533) 
Remoteness of importing country  0.867 0.741  0.838 0.620  0.480  0.462 0.395  0.399 0.165 
  (4.094) (3.168)  (3.525) (2.593)  (1.985)  (1.938) (1.783)  (1.799) (0.699) 
Remoteness of exporting country   0.614 0.737  0.794 0.604  0.474  0.399 0.436  0.430 0.617 
  (3.166) (3.529)  (3.756) (3.040)  (2.416)  (1.965) (2.326)  (2.314) (3.047) 
Volatility of bilateral exch. rate   -0.081 -0.041  0.110 -0.031  0.047  0.146 0.311  0.037 0.087 
  (-0.890) (-1.725)  (2.204) (-0.669)  (0.851)  (3.681) (3.276)  (1.318) (2.021) 
Average exchange rate volatility   0.076 0.043  -0.097 0.057  -0.011  -0.106 -0.296  -0.038 -0.052 
 of importing country   (0.797) (1.744)  (-1.593) (1.134)  (-0.185)  (-1.943) (-2.997)  (-1.334) (-1.080) 
Average exchange rate volatility   0.063 0.047  -0.102 0.054  -0.015  -0.116 -0.276  -0.027 -0.047 
 of exporting country   (0.655) (1.876)  (-1.890) (1.083)  (-0.251)  (-1.953) (-2.763)  (-0.929) (-1.003) 
Dummy: Common border   0.194 0.241  0.270 0.410  0.666  0.585 0.583  0.533 0.549 
  (1.628) (1.922)  (1.948) (1.669)  (4.893)  (4.932) (5.085)  (4.620) (4.495) 
Dummy: English speaking   0.863 0.888  1.051 1.185  1.329  1.540 1.496  1.427 1.559 
 countries  (5.800) (5.522)  (5.850) (7.169)  (7.792)  (9.201) (8.539)  (8.163) (8.312) 
Dummy: EC12   0.388 0.347  0.385 0.407  0.370  0.430 0.488  0.484 0.459 
  (4.802) (4.474)  (4.814) (4.776)  (4.675)  (5.374) (6.067)  (6.076) (5.210) 
Dummy: CEFTA  1.011 0.548  0.194 0.461  0.374  0.562 0.666  0.719 0.562 
  (3.215) (3.700)  (1.598) (2.052)  (2.233)  (3.839) (4.461)  (4.907) (4.102) 
Dummy: Europe Agreements  -0.368 -0.053  -0.257 -0.163  -0.186  0.085 0.160  0.209 0.222 
  (-2.646) (-0.426)  (-2.167) (-1.626)  (-2.206)  (1.122) (2.203)  (2.761) (2.789) 
Dummy: EFTA  0.199 0.129  0.223 0.255  0.085  0.175 0.130  0.121 0.171 
  (1.755) (1.180)  (1.937) (1.700)  (0.780)  (1.618) (1.045)  (0.932) (1.308) 
Dummy: EC12- EFTA3  0.224 0.217  0.305 0.418  0.386  0.442 0.447  0.443 0.472 
  (2.477) (2.483)  (3.671) (4.989)  (4.640)  (4.842) (5.087)  (4.961) (4.752) 
Dummy: EFTA3-Associated   -0.164 0.156  0.087 -0.044  -0.014  0.143 0.133  0.212 0.254 
 Countries  (-0.797) (1.036)  (0.592) (-0.276)  (-0.100)  (1.095) (1.024)  (1.546) (1.887)   33
 
Table 4: Continued  
  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994  1995 1996  1997 1998 
Dummy: Baltic States    3.558  2.802  3.004 3.184  3.187 2.955 
    (10.043)  (9.501)  (16.164) (17.081)  (11.819) (13.712) 
Dummy: Russia-Belarus-    2.347  3.023  2.452 2.195  2.000 3.253 
 Ukraine    (4.273)  (9.341)  (10.982) (15.261)  (9.782) (5.196) 
Dummy: Slovenia-Croatia    2.158  1.286  1.543 1.573  1.178 1.045 
    (5.939)  (8.247)  (8.546) (9.473)  (5.046) (4.220) 
Dummy: Former Czechoslovakia     2.920  2.412  2.359 2.123  1.994 1.979 
    (12.807)  (15.079)  (16.325) (15.267)  (12.472) (13.373) 
Notes: See Table 1.    34
Table 5 Augmented Gravity Model of Trade Flows, Panel Data  
  Pooled Data
 a  Time Effects
 b  Country effects
 c 
No. of observations  9242  9242  9242 
Adjusted R
2   0.8448  0.8455  0.9703 
GDP of importing country  0.884  0.881  0.873 
  (123.633)  (123.659)  (27.269) 
GDP of exporting country  0.956  0.953  0.362 
  (131.065)  (131.372)  (11.730) 
Distance  -1.092  -1.098   
  (-68.733)  (-68.307)   
Dummy: Common border   0.490  0.498   
  (9.705)  (9.700)   
Dummy: English speaking   1.259  1.272   
 countries  (22.764)  (22.322)   
Dummy: EC12   0.406  0.397   
  (15.148)  (14.741)   
Dummy: CEFTA  0.554  0.544   
  (9.284)  (9.031)   
Dummy: Europe Agreements  -0.057  -0.068   
  (-1.881)  (-2.233)   
Dummy: EFTA  0.139  0.120   
  (3.406)  (2.959)   
Dummy: EC12- EFTA3  0.367  0.357   
  (12.457)  (12.122)   
Dummy: EFTA3-Associated   0.045  0.029   
 Countries  (0.902)  (0.582)   
Remoteness of importing country  0.524  0.523   
  (6.723)  (6.697)   
Remoteness of exporting country   0.549  0.549   
  (8.217)  (8.180)   
Volatility of bilateral exch. rate   0.009  0.038  0.013 
  (1.924)  (2.309)  (6.353) 
Average exchange rate volatility   0.003  -0.029  -0.008 
 of importing country   (0.632)  (-1.616)  (-3.577) 
Average exchange rate volatility   0.007  -0.025  -0.012 
 of exporting country   (1.440)  (-1.405)  (-5.059) 
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Table 5: Continued  
  Pooled Data
 a  Time Effects
 b  Country effects
 c 
Dummy for CSFR, 1993  2.756  2.724  3.793 
  (44.843)  (38.465)  (33.028) 
Dummy for CSFR, 1994  2.407  2.410  3.475 
  (38.251)  (35.291)  (28.081) 
Dummy for CSFR, 1995  2.277  2.353  3.409 
  (33.896)  (32.842)  (25.319) 
Dummy for CSFR, 1996  2.142  2.189  3.322 
  (37.074)  (35.136)  (26.495) 
Dummy for CSFR, 1997  2.170  2.152  3.384 
  (19.014)  (18.458)  (25.262) 
Dummy for CSFR, 1998  1.999  1.957  3.313 
  (17.781)  (16.919)  (22.571) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1993  2.109  2.029  3.692 
  (20.953)  (17.954)  (35.447) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1994  1.511  1.495  3.131 
  (21.269)  (19.901)  (25.883) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1995  1.423  1.499  3.111 
  (10.482)  (10.882)  (29.838) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1996  1.353  1.396  3.049 
  (11.803)  (11.990)  (28.386) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1997  1.197  1.140  2.962 
  (6.296)  (5.930)  (25.889) 
Dummy for SLO-HR, 1998  1.019  0.967  2.815 
  (4.875)  (4.590)  (19.506) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1993  3.557  3.479  3.114 
  (17.853)  (17.276)  (20.814) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1994  3.041  3.008  2.748 
  (13.076)  (12.866)  (17.325) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1995  3.001  3.033  2.814 
  (19.714)  (19.883)  (17.535) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1996  3.027  3.054  2.925 
  (20.483)  (20.429)  (19.730) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1997  3.139  3.092  3.122 
  (13.298)  (13.221)  (18.135) 
Dummy for Baltic States, 1998  2.854  2.795  3.000 
  (15.686)  (15.249)  (12.563) 
Dummy for CIS, 1993  3.140  3.418  2.760 
  (14.136)  (12.409)  (11.185) 
Dummy for CIS, 1994  3.626  3.715  2.956 
  (17.959)  (18.931)  (13.871) 
Dummy for CIS, 1995  2.299  2.426  2.086 
  (27.969)  (26.481)  (7.670) 
Dummy for CIS, 1996  2.088  2.139  1.940 
  (24.845)  (23.957)  (8.023) 
Dummy for CIS, 1997  1.952  1.939  1.934 
  (10.634)  (10.749)  (7.852) 
Dummy for CIS, 1998  3.263  3.565  3.041 
  (9.243)  (8.681)  (9.994) 
Notes: See Table 1. 
a constant not reported, 
b time effects not reported, 
c country effects not reported.  THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
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